










































A Necessary Falsehood in the Third Man Argument:
Citation for published version:
Scaltsas, T 1992, 'A Necessary Falsehood in the Third Man Argument: Dedicated to the Memory of Gregory
Vlastos' Phronesis, vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 216-232.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:




© Scaltsas, T. (1992). A Necessary Falsehood in the Third Man Argument:: Dedicated to the Memory of Gregory
Vlastos. Phronesis, 37(2), 216-232
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
A Necessary Falsehood in the Third Man Argument: Dedicated to the Memory of Gregory
Vlastos
Author(s): Theodore Scaltsas
Source: Phronesis, Vol. 37, No. 2 (1992), pp. 216-232
Published by: BRILL
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182411 .
Accessed: 13/12/2013 05:28
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
 .
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
 .
BRILL is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Phronesis.
http://www.jstor.org 
This content downloaded from 129.215.19.193 on Fri, 13 Dec 2013 05:28:48 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
A Necessary Falsehood in the 
Third Man Argument 
Dedicated to the Memory of Gregory Vlastos 
THEODORE SCALTSAS 
Last week I painted the garden gate, and the front door of the house, 
brown. But then I paused and pondered: What more could I do to make 
them the same colour? At first I despaired . . . but gradually my mind 
drifted to the Third Man Argument for help . . . My aim in this paper is to 
show that the premisses of the Third Man Argument (TMA) are committed 
to a distinction that falsifies them in every possible world. The distinction is 
between what makes a thingf, and what makes it qualitatively identical to 
another f thing. I will argue that according to the TMA, what makes 
somethingf is not sufficient for making it qualitatively identical to anotherf 
thing. But this is the denial of a necessary truth, namely, 'beingf is sufficient 
for beingf-identical to anotherf thing';' hence, the premisses of the TMA 
cannot be true in any possible world. 
Apart from the logical analysis of the TMA, I also develop an in- 
terpretation of the Theory of Forms, regarding the nature of the Forms and 
of the relation of participation. My aim in proposing this interpretation is to 
show the plausibility of Plato's commitment to each of the premisses of the 
TMA, which, on alternative interpretations, become implausible, if not 
bizarre, beliefs to attribute to Plato. The interpretation will also help us 
gain an intuitive understanding of where and why the explanation offered 
by the Theory of Forms breaks down.2 
* The greatest part of the work for this paper was carried out during my Seeger Research 
Fellowship at Princeton University (Program in Hellenic Studies and Philosophy Depart- 
ment), Autumn, 1989. My research during that period was also supported by the British 
Academy with a Small Personal Research Grant. I am grateful to both institutions for 
providing me with the opportunity for research in a philosophically stimulating environ- 
ment. I profited from the discussions of this paper at the following philosophical semi- 
nars, where it was presented: University of California - Davis, Monash University, 
Princeton University, University of Sydney. I am especially thankful to the following 
people for their useful suggestions, some of which are acknowledged in detail in the 
notes: David Armstrong, David Furley, Mary Louise Gill, David Robinson, Malcolm 
Schofield, Richard Sorabji, Timothy Sprigge. 
' I use 'f-identical' to mean identical with respect to beingf. 
2 Space does not allow me to present and discuss the following two interpretations of the 
Third Man Argument, which are based on altogether different analyses. I shall briefly list 
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1. The Premisses and the Regress 
Within the context of the Theory of Forms, Plato explains that things arefJ 
by participation in Form F.4 Thus in the first part of the Parmenides he says: 
the difficulties I find with these interpretations. Teloh and Louzecky (1972), and Teloh 
(1981, pp. 158-167), argue that an infinite regress follows from a single premiss that does 
not require the notion of Self-Predication. All that is needed is (T): 'If a number of things 
are F, there is a single Form in virtue of which we apprehend these things as F, and these 
things . . . are not identical with this Form', which requires only the notions of predica- 
tion and non-identity (Teloh and Louzecky (1972, p. 87)). My objection to this analysis is 
that it will not generate a regreess. To generate it a further premiss must be added, 
namely a uniqueness premiss that secures that for each set of things, the Form in virtue of 
which we apprehend them as F is unique to that set of things. Otherwise, a single Form 
would be sufficient for all sets. Teloh and Louzecky do tacitlv introduce a uniqueness 
assumption: 'This Form [by which the f things in a set are apprehended to befl is one in 
respect to the many things in the set off things, and being required for that set is unique to 
it' (ibid., p. 85). But they offer no textual justification for such an assumption, which, 
further, is implausible for anyone to hold. 
William Prior (1979) argues that when the logic of the theory of paradigms is under- 
stood, it becomes evident that Form F, qua paradigm, has f-ness on entirely different 
grounds than dof things. Prior's example is the King's foot, which is set as a standard of 
measure for 'one foot', and which, therefore, is one foot on a priori grounds, as opposed 
to all other things that are n feet long by comparison to the King's foot. Similarly, for 
Prior, Form F isf, not by sharing in some Form F (which would give rise to the regress, p. 
232), but on a priori grounds qua paradigm (p. 236-237). My objection to Prior's analysis 
is that the theory of paradigms he expounds cannot be applied to the Forms. Prior's 
theory can explain the attribution of properties by convention to entities that have an 
existence independently of that convention, e.g. setting the rod to be one meter long. But 
what can a Form be such that it can acquire the property of beingf, in the way that the rod 
acquires the property of being one meter long? Yet Prior claims that 'the paradigm does 
possess the property [of beingfl, but . . . the grounds for the attribution of the property 
are quite different in the case of the paradigm' (p. 237). To what is the property of beingf 
attributed? There is nothing to which the propertyf can be attributed, so that the result of 
the attribution will be Form F. Contrary to Prior's claim, Form F cannot be f in the way 
the King's foot is one meter long. 
'E.g. see Phaedo 100c-d. In the above formulation, 'f is a placeholder for general terms 
of opposites, like 'large', 'just', 'hot', etc., and arguably, from the Parmenides, sub- 
stantial terms like 'man', 'tree' etc. 
' In the Phaedo Plato introduces the Forms as causes of things becomingf. He explains 
why a thing is beautiful as follows: 
I no longer understand nor can recognize those other wise reasons . . . but in a 
plain, artless, and possibly simple-minded way, I hold this close to myself: nothing 
else makes [poiei] it beautiful except that beautiful itself, whether by its presence 
or communion or whatever the manner and nature of the relation may be; . . . it is 
by the beautiful that all things are beautiful. (Phaedo 100c9-d8, translation from 
Gallop (1975)). 
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Do you not believe that there exists, alone by itself, a certain character of likeness, 
and again, another character opposite to it, what it is to be unlike; . . . Things that 
get a share of likeness become [gignesthai] like . . . (128e6-9a4). 
Do you think, as you say, that there are certain characters, and that these others 
here, by reason of having a share in them, get their names from them? As for 
example, things that get a share of likeness become [gignesthail like, of largeness 
large, . . . (130eS-131a2). 
That things are f by participating in Form F is the answer to two different 
questions, which Plato does not state separately. The first is, "Why is a 
thing f?" and the second, "Why are different things similar?" The first 
question concerns the predication off-ness; the second, qualitative identity 
with respect to f-ness (or f-identity). The first concerns the presence of a 
property in a thing; the second, the recurrence of a single property in 
different things. The answer the Theory of Forms gives to the first is: a thing 
isfby participating in Form F. And to the second: two things aref-identical 
by both participating in one and the same Form, namely, Form F. Thus, the 
Theory of Forms explains the similarity of two different things by tracing 
their common condition to a single cause. Sameness of condition is ex- 
plained through the oneness of the cause of the condition. If different Forms 
made different thingsf, then a further explanation would be required of the 
similarity between these different Forms, in order to explain the similarity 
of their effect in making their participantsf. In other words, the similarity of 
the effects would have to be justified by the similarity of the causes. This 
explanatory regress is impeded if the cause of all the similar effects is 
numerically one. 
It is of course essential, for such an explanation, that the cause be the 
cause of a single condition. Otherwise the same cause could produce differ- 
ent effects. Plato secures this by requiring that each Form be a single 
character or kind (monoeides, Phaedo 78d5), and hence, that each Form be 
the cause of a single condition. Thus, if different things participate in the 
same Form, they acquire the same condition. The qualitative and numerical 
oneness of the cause, then, is secured for the explanation of the similarity of 
its effects.' 
'Further, in the text of the first TMA (Parmenides 132a1-b2) Plato says that entities that 
participate in the Form of Largeness 'will all be [estail large' ( 132b I). In the second TMA 
(132c12-133a7), he says that by participation in the Form, things will be like (132e3, 
133a 1). 
The translations of the Parmenides texts are from Allen (1983), unless otherwise 
specified. 
6 Ultimately.Plato realises that even the numerical and qualitative oneness of the cause is 
not sufficient for the qualitative identity of the effects, because of the mediation of 
multiple relations of participation between the f things and the Form. Namely, if .: is 
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My concern in the analysis of the TMA is to show that the problem it 
encounters is deeply rooted in its premisses. The problem underlies the 
controversy of whether there is a single Form F per character, or many. 
That is, even if we assume that there are many Forms F per character, thus 
avoiding the contradiction Vlastos pointed to,' even then, the Theory 
cannot be salvaged; the premisses of the TMA are committed to a necessary 
falsehood - making them false in all possible worlds. So, although I agree 
with Vlastos's textual evidence that the TMA assumes there is only one 
Form F per character,8 I will here follow Sellars,' Geach,"' and Cohen," in 
allowing for many Forms F per character. My aim is to show that, even 
when Vlastos' contradiction is avoided, it nevertheless remains the case 
that the premisses entail a necessary falsehood. 
Let us now turn to the specification of the premisses of the TMA. (I shall 
use the term 'entity' to refer to both, things in the empirical world and 
Forms.) 
The TMA premisses: 
There are f things. 
(PP) An entity isf by participating in a Form F. 
(Q1) Different entities are f-identical by participating in the same Form F. 
(NI) An f entity is different from the Form F by virtue of which the entity is f. 
(SP) A Form F is f. 
It is clear that no assumption has been made about the uniqueness of Form 
F. That is, the premisses allow that there be many Forms F per character, 
e.g. many Forms of Justice or Largeness, just as Sellars required in order to 
avoid the inconsistency in Vlastos' premisses. (PP), the Predication Pre- 
miss, establishes the causal efficacy of a Form F. Plato makes this explicit 
when he states that Form F 'makes' an entityf, that an entity 'becomes'f by 
participating in a Form F, and that an entity 'is' f by participation in Form 
F.'2 
related by P, to Form F, while y by P, etc., for the effects on x and y to be similar, P, and 
P. must be similar. But this is a problem that Plato tackles in the Dilemma of Participa- 
tion, which I analyse in Scaltsas (1989, pp. 67-90). 
7Vlastos derived the self-contradiction that Form F is different from itself (since an entity 
that isf is different from Form F, and Form F isf, Vlastos (1954, pp. 326, 331)). Sellars 
argued that the contradiction arises only because it is assumed that there is a unique Form 
F per character (Sellars (1955, pp. 406-407, 418-419)). 
Vlastos (1955, pp. 439-440). 
Sellars (1955, pp. 418). 
Geach (1956, p. 77). 
"Cohen (1971, p. 462). 
The Form poiei somethingf (Phaedo lOOd5). By participation, something gignesthaif 
(Parmenides 129a4, 131a2) and esti f (Parmenides 132b1). 
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(01) is the Qualitative Identity premiss, which explains the sameness of f 
things through the qualitative and numeral oneness of the cause of their 
condition. It is important that this premiss, too, does not require that there 
be a single Form F per character. It does not say that there is a single Form F 
by virtue of which allfentities in the universe are the same. Rather, it states 
that, given any group of f entities, the sameness of their condition is 
explained through their participation in the same Form. This allows that a 
different group of f entities may have a different cause of their shared 
f-ness. 13 
Plato is firmly committed to 0I. At every step in the regress, he does not 
require only the penultimate Form to participate in the new Form, in order 
to make the penultimate Form f. Rather, he additionally requires all the f 
entities that participate in the penultimate Form to also participate in the 
new Form. By this he secures that all these f entities and the penultimate 
Form will have one and the same cause of theirf-ness - the new Form F. He 
says in the text of the first version of the TMA: 'Therefore, another 
character of largeness will have made its appearance alongside largeness 
itself and the things that have a share of it; and over and above all those, 
again, a different one, by which they will all be large' (Parmenides 132a 10- 
bI, my emphasis). By insisting that not only the penultimate Form, but all 
the f entities below it, become f by participating in the new Form, Plato 
explains the qualitative identity between them.'4 If he allowed that somef 
entities becomefby Form F,, while others becomef by Form,, and so on, he 
would still have to address the question of what makes Forms F,, F, etc., 
" When 01 is put to work in the generation of the regress, it will not apply to all f entities 
in the universe. I intend the grouping together off entities at each step of the Third Man 
regress to be understood in terms of S. Marc Cohen's notion of a maximal set, in Cohen 
(1971, pp. 461-464). See the analysis of the regress below. 
'" The text does not force us to take this position. What the text does is to introduce a 
second type of causal agency in the argument, which any interpretation must explain. 
Namely, despite the fact that object x is large by participation in the Form of Large.,,, 
Plato says that in the nth step, x is large by participation in the Form of Large, ('by which 
they will all be large', 'J' TcLi,ua t4EvTa REy64a E'rCtL', 132bl, my emphasis). Why does 
Plato require all the objects in each step (rather than just the penultimate Form) to 
participate in the highest Form? If the result of participation was just to make each of 
them f, he would be committing the system to overdetermination of causes for no reason 
at all; x would be f by participating in F,. and again by participating in Fn, etc. My 
suggestion above is that Plato requires it because something different is achieved by 
participation in the same Form, over and above each participant's becoming f by 
participating in a Form F. Namely, by participating in the same Form F, each participant 
becomes qualitatively identical to its co-participants in the same Form. This is explicitly 
stated in the second version of the TMA, at 132d9-el. 
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qualitatively identical with respect to their causal powers, in order to 
explain why the entities that participate in them become qualitatively 
identical between themselves. If he did not address this question, his 
Theory would provide no account of the similarity between f things. But 
giving a non-vacuous answer to the qualitative identity question is an essen- 
tial goal of the Theory of Forms, for which purpose 01 is imported. 
Plato is yet more explicit about QO in his second version of the TMA: 
'And must not the thing which is like share with the thing that is like it in one 
and the same character?'15 
Premiss (SP) is Vlastos' Self-Predication premiss (as amended by Sellars 
to allow for many Forms F) securing that each Form F is itself f. That the 
cause possesses the condition it produces in a thing was a fundamental belief 
in Greek thought that finds explicit expression in Aristotle: 'that which 
produces the form possesses it.'6 Further, Jonathan Barnes gives reasons 
for tracing to the Presocratics the general principle: 'If something F comes 
into being from a, then a is F.'7 Given the wide acceptance this claim 
enjoyed, it is no wonder that Plato would not consider Self-Predication a 
negotiable premiss. 
Finally, (NI) is Vlastos' amended Non-Identity premiss, securing that the 
cause off-ness is different from the entity that acquiresf-ness. We can find 
justification for the Non-Identity thesis in Aristotle's system, in which, as in 
Plato's Theory, the generation of things requires the existence of forms. 
Form is not generated, according to Aristotle. 8 If it were, the generation of 
anything would require an infinite regress of generations.'9 So, if not 
generated, form must be passed down from cause to product. Hence, the 
cause must be different from the product (NI), and must possess the form it 
passes down to the product (SP). 
The regress is generated from the premisses as follows. There are, for 
example, hot things in the world. Each of them is hot by participating in a 
'1 Parmenides 132d9-el. Cornford translation, from Cornford (Fifth printing). In fact, 
Plato describes this as a 'great necessity' (megale ananke). 
1h Physics 257blO. The belief that the causepossesses theform itproduces in the thing is so 
strong, that Aristotle finds a way of accommodating this truth even in the case where the 
cause is a craftsman: (although the builder is not a house) the form of the house is in the 
mind of the builder, and the builder's actions transmit that form to the matter (Meta- 
physics 1032b, Generation of Animals 730b). 
17 Barnes (1979, vol. 2, p. 135, his principle (1) along with vol. 1, p. 88, his (11)). See also 
discussion of Barnes' Synonymy Principle in the following section, below. I am grateful 
to David Robinson for referring me to Barnes' principle. 
Metaphysics 1034b7- 13, 1039b24-25, 1044b21-23. 
Metaphysics 1033a34-b8. 
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Form of the Hot. They are qualitatively identical between themselves by 
participating in the same Form of the Hot. These hot things are different 
from the Form of the Hot that makes them hot. That Form of the Hot is 
itself hot. Hence, that Form of the Hot and the many hot things are all hot. 
Each of them is hot by participating in a Form of the Hot, and they are 
qualitatively identical by participating in the same Form of the Hot. These 
hot entities (the first Form of the Hot included) are different from the Form 
of the Hot that makes them hot. That Form of the Hot is itself hot. Hence, 
that second Form of the Hot and the hot entities that participate in it are hot 
by participating in a Form of the Hot . . . and so on. Hence, there will be 
infinitely many Forms of the Hot.20 
2. The Necessary Falsehood 
Our concern so far has been to determine the premisses to which the Theory 
of Forms commits us, from which the Third Man regress follows. We shall 
now turn to the question of the truth of these premisses. 
According to the Theory, a thing a isf by participating in Form F1 - by PP. 
Form F, isf- by SP. a's participation in Form F1 is sufficient to make a an f 
thing. But a's participation in Form F1 does not make af-identical toF,. [By 
QI, a is f-identical to F, by participating, along with F1, in the same Form, 
namely F2 (where F, # F2 by NI). ] So participation in Form F, makes af, but 
fails to make itf-identical to anf entity, i.e. to Form F, which isf. Therefore, 
according to the Theory of Forms, what makes a thingf is not sufficient for 
making it f-identical to an f entity, which is absurd. 
That 'what makes a thingf is sufficientfor making it f-identical tof things' 
is a necessary truth, which is denied by the premisses of the TMA. There- 
fore, the premisses cannot be true in any possible world. A clarification 
might be helpful here. It is of course possible that a isf for different reasons 
than why b isf. For example, a (whose parents immigrated to this country) 
is a citizen of this country because he was born here, and b (who was not 
born here) is a citizen because his parents are citizens. Thus, what makes a a 
citizen of this country is different from what makes b a citizen of this 
country. But it cannot be the case that what makes a a citizen of this country 
is different from what makes him have the same citizenship with b (regard- 
less of what makes b a citizen of the country). Whatever makes a a citizen of 
this country, thereby gives him the same citizenship with any other citizen 
of this country (however they may have acquired their citizenship). This is 
20 We could not abandon PP while retaining QI, nor abandon Ql while retaining PP in the 
above premisses. The proof has been omitted because of lack of space. 
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denied by the premisses of the TMA. 
In the TMA, the discrepancy arises from the fact that the Theory of 
Forms places different requirements for 'making somethingf (PP) and for 
'making it f-identical' to an f thing (01). But this cannot be: making 
somethingf must be all that is required for making itf-identical to anf thing. 
It is true that a does not participate only in F1; it participates in all the 
Forms F of the generated regress. Therefore, a is f-identical to Form F1, 
since both a and F1 participate in F2. But this does not remove the dis- 
crepancy. The question is not whether a isf-identical to Form F, or not; that 
it is. Rather, the question is whether the condition that makes a f - 
participation in F1 - is sufficient to make a f-identical to an f entity - Form 
F,. What is sufficient for making somethingf must be sufficient for making it 
f-identical to an f entity. But according to the Theory of Forms it is not, 
since participation in Form F1 makes a f, but not f-identical to Form F1, 
which is f.21 
This failure cannot be overcome by the Theory, whether there is just one, 
or finitely many, or infinitely many, Forms F per character. It will always be 
the case that Form F makes a thingf, but does not make itf-identical to the 
Form itself, which is f. So, regardless of how many Forms F there are, the 
Theory is committed to the absurdity that participation in any Form F 
makes the things f, without making them f-identical to an f entity - that 
Form.22 
2' The falsehood is generated from the incompatibility between Q0 and PP. But even if we 
exclude PP from the premisses, the remaining premisses are still necessarily false, 
because PP reappears. The reason is that the condition that is sufficient for making two 
things f-identical to one another should be sufficient for making them f-identical to 
anything else to which they are f-identical. So participation in Form F, which makes a 
and bf-identical, should be sufficient to make them f-identical to F, (which is f-identical 
to them, by the SP of that version); but it is not sufficient, according to the Theory, since 
it is their common participation in F, that achieves that. Hence, the absurdity. The reason 
why the discrepancy persists even without PP is that the premisses allow us to talk of what 
makes a thing f-identical to another, which is nothing other than talking of that thing's 
being f. Hence, we have not really abandoned PP from the premisses, nor treated 
qualitative identity as an unanalysable primitive. Rather, PP has re-appeared in 01, 
which claims that there is a condition a thing must satisfy to become f-identical to 
another, namely participation in Form F, which is what possessing f-ness is. 
22 S. Marc Cohen does not include QI and PP in his premisses. It should therefore come as 
no surprise that in his version, the premisses of the TMA turn out to be 'a consistent 
premise set' (Cohen (1971, p. 456)). Cohen's interpretation does not take into account 
the causal efficacy of participation in Forms. As we have seen (Section 1, especially note 
14), Plato insists on two, causally different, conditions: participating in a Form F, and 
participating in the same Form F; the first is associated with beingf, while the second with 
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3. The Interpretation 
We have now identified the premisses of the TMA. How are we to under- 
stand them? Some of the premisses of the TMA are at first glance implau- 
sible, which raises the question of why Plato felt committed to them. For 
example, the Self-Predication premiss, which is very bizarre if we give the 
Forms an epistemological interpretation, as is often done. The concept of 
Largeness is not large, so it is difficult to see why Plato or anyone else would 
ever assume that. Similarly, we are not helped in understanding SP by 
thinking of the Forms set-theoretically; the set of green things is not green. 
To understand why Plato is committed to the premisses of the TMA we 
need to understand the type of explanation that he is offering through the 
Theory of Forms. 
One of the most ancient models of explanation is explanation by origin. 
According to it, the presence of a feature is explained by identifying the 
producer or creator.23 Thus, an artifact is beautiful because Hephaestus or 
Pheidias made it, and Pharaohs have superlative wisdom because of their 
divine origin. A restriction on the generality of explanation by origin is 
imported by what Barnes has described as the Synonymy Principle, which 
he considers to have a Presocratic origin (Barnes (1979, vol. 1, p. 88)): 
"'Causation is by synonyms" . . . the principle is supported by numerous 
examples; and it helps to explain the occult property of causality: causes 
produce changes in the objects they effect by transferring or imparting 
something to those objects; when the fire makes me warm, it bestows heat 
upon me'.2 The restriction introduced by the synonymy principle is the 
beingf-identical to anotherf thing. In Cohen's version, the One-over-Many premiss is the 
following: 'For any maximal set there is exactly one Form in which all and only members 
of that set participate' (Cohen (1971, p. 462)). This premiss fails to connect participation 
in a Form to either beingf, or to being f-identical to other things. The premiss provides 
only an existential principle generating Forms. But the premiss does not specify what, 
according to the Theory, is achieved by participation in a Form. More importantly it does 
not explain why it is that Plato requires that at each step, it is the last Form in that step 'by 
which they [i.e. the large things and Forms participating in it] will all be large' (4 Taviar 
JTavTa cEseyaa EcOrat, Parmenides 132bl, my emphasis). The causal efficacy of partici- 
pation in the latest Form in each step needs justification, which is not offered in Cohen's 
premisses. In my version, it is explained by showing that according to the Theory, 
participation in the same Form F does work that participation in a Form F does not do; 
namely, participation in the same Form F accounts, not only for being f, but also for 
being qualitatively identical to other f things. 
23 See, for example, Moravcsik (1989, p. 258). 
24 Barnes (1979, vol. 2, p. 119, and vol. 1, p. 88). An example, suggested to me by David 
Robinson, is given in Aristotle's Metaphysics, 1070a4-5: 'each substance comes into 
being out of something synonymous' (where synonymy requires sameness of kind. 
Categories ta6-7). 
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requirement of similarity between the nature of the producer and the nature 
of the product. A particular strand of explanation by 'synonymous origin' is 
the explanation of a phenomenon by the inheritance of characteristics. On 
this biological model of explanation, the presence of a feature is explained 
by identifying the parents as the source from which the feature was inher- 
ited; thus Aristotle: 'the producer is of the same kind as the produced . . . 
(for man produces man)' (Metaphysics 1033b30-32).25 
The biological model of explanation is characterised by the following four 
features. First, explanation of the presence of a feature in the offspring 
consists in tracing the feature in question to the source, the parents. 
Otherwise, no explanation has been given, since nothing inherits a feature 
from itself. Second, the source from which the feature has been inherited 
must itself possess that feature. If the parents do not possess the feature, 
they cannot pass it on to the offspring. Third, the relation of offspring to 
parents is such that the feature of the parents can be passed on to the 
offspring that inherits it. Fourth, similarity between offspring is explained 
in terms of their family-relation: they are similar because they inherit the 
characteristic from the same parents.26 
One can see how the biological model matches the explanatory use that 
Plato makes of the Theory of Forms regarding why things are f. Under- 
standing the Theory in terms of the biological model, a Form F is the source 
off-ness, and things that participate in the Form inherit theirf-ness from the 
Form. The source from which the f-ness is inherited must be different from 
the thing that inherits it. Otherwise, no explanation is offered since a thing 
can inherit nothing from itself. Hence, the Non-Identity between an entity 
and the Form it partakes of. Further, the source must itself possessf-ness. If 
the source does not possess f-ness, nothing can inherit f-ness from that 
source. Hence, Self-Predication. That the relation of thing to source is such 
as to allow the thing to inherit the f-ness of the source is guaranteed by the 
Predication-Premiss. And finally, that two or more things resemble one 
another because they share a common origin of their condition - because 
25 I use the term 'biological model' to capture some, only, features of this type of 
explanation, which will become clear in what follows. It should not be thought that this 
model of explanation does justice to all our fundamental intuitions regarding biological 
inheritance relations. 
26 I originally described this model of explanation in terms of a medical rather than a 
biological paradigm. I had then considered a version of the biological model and not 
chosen it for reasons given in Scaltsas (1989, pp. 68-69). I have now returned to the 
biological one because it can be better historically documented. I would like to thank 
Mary Louise Gill for encouraging me to adopt the biological model. 
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they are family-related - is secured in the Qualitative-Identity premiss. 
Plato, himself, uses the biological model to describe the role of the Forms 
in the world. He describes the generation of things in the world as follows, 
in the Timaeus: the eternal intelligible beings (the Forms) are like a father, 
who is the source (to d'hothen, 50dl) of the forms that are passed on to a 
receptacle (acting as matter), thereby generating children (i.e. things in the 
world) that resemble that father (the Forms).27 The biological model itself is 
elaborately developed by Aristotle, where the movement in the semen 
transmits the form of the father to the offspring.8 
On the biological model, Form F, qua source of f-ness, endows the 
participating things with what it takes to bef. Acquiring what it takes to bef 
is acquiring the necessary and sufficient condition for beingf. But since the 
Form must possess this feature in actuality, the Form is the realised neces- 
sary and sufficient condition for being f. This allows the Form to be either 
the property off-ness or the paradigm f thing. It further allows the particip- 
ation relation to be either a content-relation, e.g. having a part of the 
property, or a form-relation, e.g. resembling the paradigm. Plato explores 
both types of relation in the two versions of the TMA he offers in the text.29 
On the basis of the interpretation of the Theory of Forms through the 
biological model of explanation, we can understand the requirements made 
by PP and QI as follows. PP tells us that a creature is human because it 
inherited the nature of its human parents. 0I says that two creatures are 
similar because they have the same origin. But then it follows that, although 
the offspring has inherited the parents' nature, that does not make it similar 
to its parents, since what makes it similar to them is that they all come from 
the same grandparents. That is absurd. 
I think it would be profitable to discuss the query of an anonymous 
referee. The referee wondered whether there is anything wrong with of- 
fering the following explanation in terms of the biological model: what 
makes me human is that I have a human ancestor; what makes you human is 
that you have a human ancestor; what makes us both human is that we have 
27 Timaeus 50c-5 1b. lam grateful to Mary Louise Gill for this reference; see Gill (1987, p. 
38). 
2 Generation of Animals, 730b. In Aristotle, for the reasons explained in note 16, the 
biological model drifts close together with the craftsman model of explanation. (See the 
Phaedo passage in note 4 for suggestions of the craftsman model in the Theory of the 
Forms.) 
2 Parmenides 132al-b2, and 132cl2-133a7. For my reasons for claiming that the first 
version of the TMA is exploring participation as a content-relation, see Scaltsas (1989, 
pp. 72-73, and 87). 
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a common human ancestor; what makes both us and our ancestor human is 
that we all three have a common human ancestor. The point of the question 
is to indicate that there is after all a common condition that is responsible 
for both, being human and being the same as other humans, namely: having 
the same human ancestor. Regardless who the ancestor is, 'having the same 
ancestor' is in all cases what accounts for being human and being qual- 
itatively identical to other humans. But even here there is a discrepancy 
between predication and qualitative identity; what makes me human is 
different from what makes me the same as you. I am human because 'l have 
a human ancestor' while I am the same with you because 'we have the same 
human ancestor'. So, that I am human because my parents are human, and 
you are human because your parents are human, does not establish, even 
on this explanation, that we are similar with respect to being human, since it 
is not established that we have any common ancestors. But this could not 
be: if we are human, we must be similar. 
4. Was Plato Aware of the Necessary Falsehood? 
Sellars thought that although on his version the premisses of the TMA are 
consistent (Sellars (1955, p. 419)), Plato still had good reason to reject it 
because it involved an infinity of Forms F: 'there is no logical absurdity in an 
infinite series as such. . . . But would not Plato himself have regarded the 
infinite series as already unacceptable, and sufficient ro refute the Theory if 
it could be shown to be a consequence of it?' (Sellars (1955, p. 407)) But, 
why should Plato object to the infinity of Forms F per character, if that gave 
a solution to the most fundamental metaphysical problems, namely, the 
problem of predication and that of qualitative identity? Yet, Plato does 
object to it, but I shall argue it is not because of his fear for the infinity of 
Forms F per character, but because of his fear of the multitude of Forms F, 
whether infinite or finite. 
In the first version of the TMA, the opening line claims the uniqueness of 
Form F: 'I suppose you think that each character is one' (132al). And the 
conclusion states the contradictory result: 'each of the characters will no 
longer be one for you but unlimited in multitude' (132bl-2). Similarly, in 
the second version of the TMA, Plato again assumes there is only one Form 
per character,30 and derives an infinity of Forms per character (133al-2). 
Importantly, he does not suggest that the contradiction can be avoided by 
giving up the uniqueness of Form F. Far from it, he proceeds to conclude 
' See use of definite article, in 'the character', at 132d5 and 132e6. 
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from this contradiction that the assumption that participation is a re- 
semblance relation cannot save the Theory of Forms, since, even on this 
assumption, we still get the contradiction (of one Form - many Forms, 
133a5-7). It follows, therefore, that for Plato there is no way out of the 
contradiction, and therefore, that for him, the uniqueness of Form F is an 
inviolable, non-negotiable premiss of the Theory. Why? 
Why is Plato not hailing the TMA as a discovery that there are infinitely 
many Forms per character, rather than only one? Why is he not celebrating 
the TMA as an argument that reveals, through the regress, the true answer 
to the question of why things are f.. I believe the reason is the following. 
Form F is assumed to be the source off-ness, on the basis of which we can 
explain why things are f. If the source off-ness cannot account for all the 
f-predication and f-identity in the world,3' adding more sources to complete 
the task would be a non-starter. The very cloning of the source - Form F - 
undermines the possibility of there being a source. 
But there are two different problems that arise from the multiplicity of 
Forms F per character, and it is only one of the two that Plato is concerned 
about in the TMA. The following distinction must be introduced to sharply 
differentiate between two deceptively similar problems of multiplicity of 
Forms. We have already seen that the Theory of Forms explains the 
similarity between things in terms of the oneness of the cause of their 
condition. Thus, consider the following situation: a is f by participating in 
Form F, (but not in F,), and b isf by participating in Form F, (but not in F,), 
and neither Form participates in the another; here the question of the 
similarity of a and b has not been answered by the Theory. An account 
would still be required of the similarity between F, and F2 to explain why 
their effects on a and b are similar, making a and b f. So, a multitude of 
sources of f-ness is incompatible with the Theory's attempt to answer the 
qualitative identity question in terms of a singular cause of the condition of 
similar things.32 Let us call this case of multiplicity of sources the Dis- 
sociative Multiplicity of Forms. ('Dissociative' to indicate that a thing that 
participates in one Form F does not participate in other Forms F.) 
This is not the problem that the multiplicity of Forms would give rise to in 
the TMA, if Plato allowed for many Forms F per character. The difference 
31 E.g. it cannot account for its own f-ness and for its f-identity to f things. 
32 I have argued that this case of multiplicity of Forms F per character is rejected by Plato 
by his rejection of participation in parts of the Form (131cS-1 1), in the Second Horn of 
the Dilemma of Participation. The reason is that such a theory would fail to address the 
qualitative identity question. See Scaltsas ( 1989, pp. 76-78, especially the First Disjunct) . 
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is that in the TMA structure, a thing participates in all Forms F."3 Let us call 
this case of multiplicity of sources the Associative Multiplicity of Forms, to 
indicate that if a thing participates in one, it participates in all Forms F. 
Plato must be fully aware of the difference between the two cases of 
multiplicity of Forms F, if he discusses them separately and uses different 
arguments to counter each of them.34 The formal difference between the 
two cases of multiplicity of Forms is that the Associative satisfies, while the 
Dissociative does not satisfy, the condition for qualitative identity: for any 
two f entities (things or Forms), there is a Form F in which they both 
participate .5 
Let us consider the Associative type of multiplicity of Forms, which 
satisfies the condition for qualitative identity. (I.e. let us assume that Plato 
allows for the many Forms F of the TMA regress.) The difficulty here is not 
that there are f things that do not share a common source of their f-ness. 
Rather, it is that, given an f thing, the source of its f-ness is different from 
the source of itsf-identity to otherf things. F2 does for a just what F1 does for 
a, namely, make itf. And yet, in so doing, F2 does for a what F1 fails to do for 
a, namely, make a f-identical to F,. The absurdity is that the contribution 
that F2 makes to a must be both identical to the contribution that F1 makes to 
a and different from the contribution that F1 makes to a. This discrepancy 
must be what is preventing Plato from allowing for more than one Form F 
per character. 
The problem, here too, as in the Dissociative case, is with the multiplicity 
of sources. But here it is not that, given any twof entities, we cannot find a 
common source in which they participate. Rather, it is that the source of 
f-ness of a thing is different from its source of f-identity to other f-things. 
This is an unacceptable division of semantic labour between f-predication 
and f-identity: The Form that makes something f does not also make it 
f-identical to all otherf entities (e.g., it cannot make the thingf-identical to 
the Form itself; other Forms have to be allocated that task).36 
33 This, of course, would not be true of Forms F, since e.g. Form F3 does not participate in 
F,. 
3 He dismisses the Dissociative case in the Second Horn of the Dilemma of Participation 
(see note 32), and the Associative case in the TMA. 
35 If Form F were unique, then the Theory would satisfy the stronger condition, that there 
is a Form F in which any two f entities participate. 
3 In a set theoretic interpretation of the TMA, the problem of the division of semantic 
labour arises from the fact that beingf is being a member of any one of different, maximal 
(see note 13 above), sets offentities. But how can 'beingf be being a member of a set off 
entities, when that set excludes even one f entity - as all sets in the TMA regress do? 
Being a member of the same set purports to be what is common betweenf entities, to the 
exclusion of non-f entities. If some f entities are also excluded from the set, then 
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In conclusion, then, Plato assumed a unique Form F per character, and 
was forced by the TMA to conclude that there are many Forms F per 
character. He could have avoided the contradiction by allowing an (Associ- 
ative) multiplicity of Forms F per character, while hailing the TMA as their 
discovery! That he did not do so indicates that he had an immediate 
apprehension of the threat that such a multiplicity of sources off-ness posed 
for the Theory of Forms. We have no evidence that Plato saw the threat 
clearly for what it is, namely, as the absurd division of semantic labour 
between f-predication and f-identity. But he could see that having many 
sources off-ness is having no source off-ness. Hence, multiplicity of Forms 
F per character was seen as fatal to the Theory, and hence, the TMA (which 
shows that even when he assumes a unique Form F, to explain why things 
aref, infinitely many Forms F need to be imported to do the job) was seen 
as a criticism of the Theory rather than the salvation of it. 
5. Conclusion 
My concern in this paper has been, first, to offer a logical analysis of the 
Third Man Argument, by identifying the premisses and examining their 
truth. Second, to provide an interpretation of the Forms and the participa- 
tion relation, which would help us understand why Plato committed himself 
to these premisses. The pursuit of the logic of the argument resulted in the 
identification of two distinct premisses, one explaining why things aref, and 
the other, why things are similar with respect to f-ness. This revealed a 
discrepancy between the two premisses: satisfying the condition for beingf 
is not sufficient for being qualitatively identical to an f entity - which is 
absurd. This absurdity is derived on the minimal set of premisses required 
for the TMA regress, which does not include the premiss in Vlastos' 
analysis, that there is a unique Form F per character. 
The interpretation involved understanding a Form as a source of f-ness, 
and participation in a Form as the acquisition of thef-ness of the Form. The 
interpretation allows us to understand how Plato used the Theory to answer 
both the predication and the qualitative identity questions. First, a thing isf 
by acquiring its f-ness from the source, and second, it is similar to other f 
things by sharing with them one and the same source of their condition. But 
herein lies the problem: the first claims that a thing acquires the condition of 
membership in that set cannot be whatf entities share in common. So membership in the 
set fails to qualify its members asf-identical to thef entities which are excluded from that 
set. But failing to qualify them as beingf-identical tof entities is failing to qualify them as 
being f. 
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the source (thereby becoming similar to it) by participating in it; the second 
claims that the thing becomes similar to the source (not by participating in it, 
but) only by participating along with the source in a further source. Hence 
the absurdity. 
The conclusion of the above analysis is that the Theory of Forms is an 
impossible explanatory model of why things aref. It requires participation 
in a Form F to pass on the Form's condition to the participating thing; but it 
denies that participation in that Form is what makes the thing similar to that 
Form.37 Hence, the Theory makes impossible demands on the participation 
relation. 
University of Edinburgh 
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